The determinants of CEO compensation of listed firms in Vietnam

Ngo My Tran * , Giang Minh Tien and Bui Van Trinh

* Corresponding author (nmtran@ctu.edu.vn)

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Received: 10 Dec 2017
Revised: 20 Jan 2018
Accepted: 31 Aug 2018
Published: 31 Aug 2018
Title: The determinants of CEO compensation of listed firms in Vietnam
DOI: 10.22144/ctu.jvn.2018.112
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How to Cite
Trân, N. M., Tiến, G. M., & Trịnh, B. V. (2018). The determinants of CEO compensation of listed firms in Vietnam. CTU Journal of Science, 54(6), 196-205. https://doi.org/10.22144/ctu.jvn.2018.112
Issue
Vol. 54 No. 6 (2018)
Section
Economics

Abstract

This research investigated the determinants on CEO compensation of firms listed on the Vietnamese stock market. The data included 187 non – financial companies listed in the period from 2012 to 2015. The main analysis method of this research was Generalized Method of Moment. The results showed a significant positive relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation. The results also showed a significantly positive relationship between company size and CEO compensation. Other factors were also found to have a positive impact on CEO compensation such as foreign ownership, CEO tenure and CEO education. However, there was no evidence on the effect of private ownership, state ownership, CEO age, CEO ownership and CEO duality on CEO compensation.
Keywords: CEO, company performance, compensation, GMM

Tóm tắt

Bài viết nghiên cứu các nhân tố ảnh hưởng đến thù lao cho Tổng giám đốc (CEO) của các công ty niêm yết trên thị trường chứng khoán Việt Nam. Bài viết sử dụng số liệu thứ cấp được thu thập trong giai đoạn năm 2012 - 2015 của 187 công ty phi tài chính niêm yết trên thị trường chứng khoán Việt Nam. Phương pháp nghiên cứu chính được sử dụng là phương pháp Gernalized Method of Moment (GMM). Kết quả nghiên cứu cho thấy hiệu quả công ty thể hiện thông qua lợi nhuận trên mỗi cổ phần và giá trị thị trường của công ty có mối tương quan thuận với thù lao của Tổng giám đốc công ty (CEO). Bên cạnh đó, quy mô công ty và tỷ lệ sở hữu cổ phần của nước ngoài cũng có mối tương quan thuận với thù lao của CEO. Tuy nhiên, nghiên cứu chưa tìm thấy bằng chứng về mối quan hệ của các nhân tố như tỷ lệ sở hữu cổ phần của tư nhân, tỷ lệ sở hữu cổ phần của Nhà nước, tuổi của CEO, tỷ lệ sở hữu cổ phần của CEO, quyền nắm giữ chức vụ kép và thù lao của CEO.
Từ khóa: CEO, GMM, hiệu quả công ty, thù lao

Article Details

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